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This symposium issue of the New York Law School Law Review is devoted to the
thirtieth anniversary of Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”).1 The key question
about the CRA as it enters its fourth decade is whether it is still relevant, let alone
whether it will continue to be relevant for another thirty years. In answering this
question, it is helpful to identify the CRA’s goals, the means for achieving these
goals, and its justifications.
Congress’ goals in passing the CRA were to eliminate the related practices of
bank redlining and capital export.2 Local bank branches would take deposits from
local neighborhood residents, and instead of returning the deposits to the residents in
the form of home mortgage or other loans would “redline” the local neighborhoods
and refuse to make loans there. The banks would then export this deposit capital to
other communities, leaving their local neighborhoods starved for investment capital.
Redlining and capital export caused or contributed to a cycle of disinvestment in and
decline of urban, lower-income, and predominantly minority neighborhoods.
Congress hoped that the CRA would help end these related practices and revitalize
these underserved neighborhoods.
The means Congress employed for ending redlining and capital export were
straightforward. The CRA was and is a relatively simple law.3 It places on banks an
ongoing and affirmative obligation to “meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered,” including low- and moderate-income (“LMI”)
neighborhoods.4 It requires the four federal agencies that regulate banks to evaluate
the record of each regulated bank at meeting local credit needs, to issue periodic
written CRA performance evaluation reports that include a CRA rating, and to take
account of a bank’s record of meeting community credit needs when deciding whether
to grant its expansion applications.5 The agency can approve, deny, or delay a merger
based on the bank’s CRA record.6
There were three main justifications for the CRA. The first was that banks were
chartered to meet the convenience and needs of their communities, which includes
meeting the credit needs of their communities. The second justification took the
form of a quid pro quo. Banks received from the government significant advantages
over their competitors, including a quasi-monopoly, relatively inexpensive deposit
insurance, and exclusive access to cheaper money. In return, it was fair to ask them
to meet the public purpose of satisfying local credit needs. The final justification
1.

12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2006).

2.

See John Taylor & Josh Silver, The Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Looking to the
Future, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 203, 204 (2009); Warren Traiger, The Community Reinvestment Act: A
Welcome Anomaly in the Foreclosure Crisis, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 227, 228–29 (2009).

3.

See Traiger, supra note 2, at 229.

4.

Taylor & Silver, supra note 2 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006)).

5.

See Taylor & Silver, supra note 2, at 204–05. The federal banking agencies are the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. See id. For more information about these
agencies and the banks they regulate, see Josh Silver & Richard Marsico, An Analysis of the Implementation
and Impact of the 2004–2005 Amendments to the Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: The Continuing
Importance of the CRA Examination Process, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 271, 272 n.4 (2009).

6.

See Taylor & Silver, supra note 2, at 206.
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was fundamental fairness. It was only fair that banks, who were more than willing
to take the deposits of local neighborhood residents and use them to make profits,
should return those deposits in the form of loans to the community residents who
supported the bank.
Thirty years after Congress passed the CRA, the market conditions underlying
the CRA’s goals, means, and justifications have changed. As to goals, although
there is evidence that LMI communities and communities of color still receive a
disproportionately low share of bank loans, these underserved communities are currently suffering more acutely from reverse redlining than traditional redlining, as
lenders are targeting them for higher priced subprime loans, many of which contain
predatory clauses that make repayment very difficult.7 These loans are leading to
record high rates of foreclosure with devastating consequences for borrowers and
neighborhoods. 8 In addition, residents of underserved communities suffer from
being on the wrong side of a two-tiered financial system, from which they lack access to bank branches and the cheaper deposit and loan products they offer, and
instead are forced to deal with more expensive financial entities such as check cashers
and payday lenders.9 A law like the CRA that is designed to fight redlining and
capital export is not necessarily well-suited to end reverse redlining or the two-tiered
financial services system.
As to means, banks and the financial services industry have grown beyond the
means the CRA employs to regulate them. Banks are no longer the dominant institutional provider of consumer financial services. Many financial services companies
not covered by the CRA—including mortgage bankers, insurance companies, and
securities dealers—provide a full array of deposit and credit products to consumers as
well as other options for investing their money. In addition, banks are no longer the
local, unitary institutions they were when the CRA was passed. They no longer
simply take deposits from and make loans to local neighborhood residents through
local bank branches. Instead, they are national and even international in scope.
They are often one component part of multi-company holding companies and have
affiliates and subsidiaries that perform traditional and non-traditional banking functions. The CRA, which covers only banks—defined narrowly as depository
institutions—is not up to the task of regulating the entire financial services industry.
Finally, the CRA’s justifications seem no longer fully applicable. The fundamental fairness argument appears to have gone the way of the neighborhood bank.
Our highly mobile society and rapidly changing financial services industry does not
create the image of a local bank taking deposits from local residents and lending the
money back for home mortgages or other needs. The quid pro quo argument also has
less support, as the quasi-monopoly, relatively low-cost deposit insurance, and access
7.

See Gregory D. Squires, Urban Development and Unequal Access to Housing Finances Services, 53 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 255, 259–63 (2009).

8.

See id.

9.

See id.
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to cheaper money that banks enjoy does not seem to give them the competitive advantage they once had. Finally, imposing a public purpose on banks stemming from
their charter, while still a valid exercise of governmental power, seems unfair in light
of the absence of such a requirement on banks’ competitors, who did not really offer
the competition to banks at the time Congress passed the CRA that they do now.
If the CRA’s goals, means, and justifications are not as closely related to market
reality as they were in 1977, the question is: What is to be done? Repeal the CRA?
Allow it to fade into oblivion along with the neighborhood bank? Amend it to reflect current market conditions? One way to determine what is to be done with the
CRA is to determine what the CRA has done. Broadly stated, the CRA has democratized capital.10 It has done so in two ways. First, it has expanded the number of
people who have a voice in how loan capital is distributed. This expansion is most
obvious when community advocates oppose bank merger applications on the grounds
that the bank has not met community credit needs. These so-called CRA challenges have led to trillions of dollars in community lending commitments by banks.11
In addition, and not as obviously, members of the public exercise a say in the distribution of loan capital through the public CRA evaluation process, the threat of CRA
challenges, and the public availability of significant amounts of important data about
bank community lending records. The public nature of the CRA has put pressure
on banks to work continuously to meet credit needs. The second way the CRA has
democratized capital is that it has allowed more people to participate in the wealthbuilding possibilities of the economic system by influencing banks to make loans to
buy a home or start a business. Several studies have documented the impact the
CRA has had on lending and estimated that banks have made tens of thousands of
loans they would not have made without the CRA.12 As a result, the recipients of
these loans are participating in the economic system in a way they would not have
without the CRA.
The claim that the CRA has democratized capital can provide a framework for
thinking about what is to be done with the CRA in the future. Continuing to give
a voice to the community in lending decisions and continuing to expand the economic pie are the starting points. Two contemporary problems that should be
addressed—reverse redlining and the two-tiered financial services system—demonstrate new aspects of democratizing capital. In The Community Reinvestment Act at
30: Looking Backward and Looking to the Future, John Taylor and Josh Silver present a
comprehensive plan for developing the means for the CRA to accomplish its goal of
democratizing capital. 13 The plan retains the basic requirement of the CRA—the
ongoing obligation to meet the credit needs of local communities. It retains the
public availability of data about bank lending and the public CRA evaluation pro10.

See Richard D. Marsico, Democratizing Capital: The History, Law, and Reform of the
Community Reinvestment Act (2005).

11.

See Taylor & Silver, supra note 2, at 206–09.

12.

For a brief summary of these studies, see id.

13.

For a brief summary of this plan, see id. at 224–25.
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cess. The plan reflects the changes in the financial services industry and the changes
in the character of banking from local to national to international since the CRA
was passed, banks’ loss of control over the consumer financial services market, and
the growth of reverse redlining and the two-tiered financial system. Taylor and
Silver’s plan includes extending the CRA to cover financial services companies other
than banks, expanding the geographic area in which banks have CRA obligations,
requiring bank affiliates to be included in the bank’s CRA evaluations, requiring
CRA evaluations to evaluate lending based on race, and more rigorous evaluation of
bank branching patterns.14
An article by Josh Silver and me and another by Warren Traiger support the
proposition—crucial to the successful implementation of Taylor’s and Silver’s proposal—that the CRA has had a positive impact on bank lending decisions and that the
criteria the federal banking agencies use in CRA performance evaluations influence
bank lending practices. 15 In addition to Taylor’s and Silver’s suggestions for improving the CRA, Gregory Squires, in his article, Uneven Development and Unequal
Access to Housing Finance Services, suggests that laws such as living wage laws that are
designed to reduce the wealth and income gap are necessary before the two-tiered
financial system or reverse redlining can be eliminated.16
Taylor and Silver first address both the fact that banks are no longer the dominant entity in the consumer financial services industry and the consequence that
imposing community reinvestment obligations on banks alone cannot accomplish the
goals of the CRA. They propose extending the CRA to cover the financial institutions that now compete with banks.17 These entities include credit unions, mortgage
banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. Silver and Taylor support this
proposal by citing evidence that credit unions and mortgage companies do not perform as well as banks at serving the credit needs of local communities.18 They also
support the proposal by arguing that extending the CRA to insurance companies
and securities firms would facilitate economic development and wealth-building
among LMI and minority persons and communities.19
In his article, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Welcome Anomaly in the
Foreclosure Crisis, Warren Traiger provides evidentiary support that expanding the
coverage of the CRA to non-bank financial institutions might improve their subprime lending records, although Traiger himself does not make this proposal.20
Traiger shows evidence that the CRA has an impact on bank lending behavior.21
14.

See id.

15.

See Silver & Marsico, supra note 5, at 292; Traiger, supra note 2, at 229–30.

16.

See Squires, supra note 7, at 265–66.

17.

See Taylor & Silver, supra note 2, at 224–25.

18.

See id. at 206–09.

19.

See id.

20. See Traiger, supra note 2, at 228–29.
21.

See id.

197

INTRODUCTION

Specifically, he finds that banks lending in the geographic areas in which they have
CRA obligations made lower percentages of subprime loans than lenders not covered
by the CRA.22 Banks were two-thirds less likely to make subprime loans than nonbank lenders not covered by the CRA.23 Although Traiger does not explicitly say so,
a fair inference from his findings is that extending the CRA to non-bank financial
institutions could improve their subprime lending records.
Second, Taylor and Silver address the fact that the CRA covers banks only in the
geographic areas where they make loans and have branches. The growth of banks
from local to national institutions that make loans not only in their local communities through local branches but nationally through several different distribution
channels means that the CRA covers only a small part of their lending and makes it
very difficult for the CRA to accomplish its goals.24 To remedy this, Taylor and
Silver propose expanding the area in which banks have CRA obligations from the
communities in which they make loans and have branches to the communities in
which they make a significant percentage of all the loans in those communities.25
Warren Traiger’s article once again provides evidentiary support for this proposal, although Traiger again does not explicitly endorse it. Traiger’s research shows
that banks lending in the geographic areas in which they have CRA obligations were
more likely to retain loans in their portfolio—a strong indicator that the loan is a safe
and sound loan—than banks lending outside of the areas in which they have CRA
obligations.26 Once again, this finding suggests that expanding the geographical
area in which banks have CRA obligations could help diminish subprime lending.27
Third, Taylor and Silver address the fact that banks are no longer unitary institutions but are frequently one part of a multi-layered financial holding company.
Non-depository affiliates of banks that make loans are not covered by the CRA unless the bank elects that they be covered. This loophole allows a bank to make its
CRA-related loans itself and take credit for them and to divert its non-CRA loans to
its affiliates, thus artificially inflating its own CRA record.28 The Joint Center for
Housing Studies at Harvard University found that the failure to include affiliates in
CRA exams, combined with limiting the geographic area in which banks have CRA
22.

See id.

23.

See id.

24.

See Taylor & Silver, supra note 2, at 209–10.

25.

See id. at 210.

26. See Traiger, supra note 2, at 234–37.
27. See, e.g., Taylor & Silver, supra note 2, at 209–10. During the 2008 presidential campaign, many

commentators blamed the CRA for the subprime lending crisis. See Editorial, Misplaced Blame, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 2008, at A34. The Comptroller of the Currency denied this, citing evidence that
lenders not regulated by the CRA made 75% of subprime loans. Remarks by John C. Dugan,
Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Enterprise Network Conference, Nov. 18, 2008, available at
http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/2008-136a.pdf. The Federal Reserve made similar findings. See Robert
B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, The 2007 HMDA Data, available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2008/pdf/hmda07draft.pdf.
28. See Taylor & Silver, supra note 2, at 211–12.
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obligations, contributed to the fact that the CRA covered less than 30% of home
mortgage loans in 2000.29 To help remedy this, Taylor and Silver recommend that
bank non-depository lending affiliates such as mortgage companies be included in
the bank’s CRA performance evaluation.30
Fourth, Taylor and Silver recognize that minority borrowers and neighborhoods
receive a disproportionately low percentage of home mortgage loans and a disproportionately high share of subprime home mortgage loans. They point out that CRA
performance evaluations do not consider a bank’s lending by race and suggest that
doing so might increase minority communities’ and borrowers’ shares of home mortgage loans and decrease their shares of subprime loans. They thus call on the federal
banking agencies to consider a bank’s lending by race when conducting bank CRA
performance evaluations.31
Taylor and Silver address the growth of the two-tiered financial services system
with proposals they make regarding the federal banking agencies’ evaluation of bank
branch locations. Taylor and Silver recognize the importance of access to bank
branches and deposit accounts for LMI consumers. Banking relationships are important to LMI persons because the relationships allow them to accumulate savings
for loan down payments and collateral requirements for home mortgage and small
business loans.32 Warren Traiger cites evidence showing a strong negative correlation
between the number of bank branches in a neighborhood and the number of foreclosures in the neighborhood: as the number of branches goes up, the rate of foreclosure
declines.33 The federal banking regulatory agencies have traditionally not rigorously
evaluated a bank’s distribution of branch locations to determine whether they were
serving LMI neighborhoods.34 Additionally, following amendments to the CRA
regulations in 2004 and 2005, the federal banking agencies reduced the amount of
information banks had to provide about their branch locations in their CRA performance evaluations, making it more difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the bank’s
branch distribution.35 Silver and Taylor call on the federal banking agencies to develop “clear and objective measures” for evaluating the distribution of bank branches
and whether the distribution adequately serves LMI neighborhoods.36
Several of Taylor’s and Silver’s proposals for improving the CRA share the underlying assumption that changing the way that the federal banking agencies evaluate
bank CRA performance (e.g., expanding the geographic area in which banks have
CRA obligations, including bank affiliate lending in CRA exams, considering
29. See id.
30. See id. at 222–23.
31.

See id. at 212–13.

32.

See id. at 213.

33.

See id. at 213–15.

34. See id.
35.

See Silver & Marsico, supra note 5, at 292.

36. See Taylor & Silver, supra note 2, at 214.
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lending by race, and more rigorous evaluation of bank branch locations) will have an
impact on bank lending. Josh Silver and I provide support for this assumption in An
Analysis of the Implementation and Impact of the 2004-2005 Amendments to the
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: The Continuing Importance of the CR A
Examination Process. Silver and I demonstrate that the CRA performance evaluations and the criteria the federal banking agencies employ affect bank behavior.37
Silver and I examined the impact that the federal banking agencies’ amendments to
the CRA regulations in 2004 and 2005 had on bank community development
lending. We found that changes that the Office of Thrift Supervision made to the
CRA performance evaluations of large thrifts that decreased the importance of community development lending and investment led to decreases in community
development and lending by large thrifts.38 We also found that, when given the
chance, large thrifts reduced the weight their community development lending and
investment had on their CRA ratings when they had relatively poor records of community development lending and investment.39
Finally, in his article, Uneven Development and Unequal Access to Housing Finance
Services, Gregory Squires looks beyond the CRA for solutions to the subprime and
predatory lending crises and the emergence and growth of the two-tiered financial
system.40 Squires argues that the concentration of wealth and income at the top of
the socioeconomic ladder combined with concentrations of poverty at the bottom
have fueled subprime and predatory lending and the two-tiered financial system in
underserved communities. While strengthening the CRA and related laws will help
ameliorate these problems, they will not be sufficient; policies that address economic
inequality must be instituted as well.
Squires cites several statistics that show the growing disparity between the upper
and lower rungs of the economic ladder. For example, “[b]etween 1967 and 2005,
the share of income in the U.S. going to the top quintile of all households increased
from 43.6% to 50.4%, while the share going to the bottom fifth dropped from 4.0%
to 3.4%.”41 Between 1983 and 2001, the share of wealth held by the top 5% grew
from 56.1% to 59.2%.42 The consequences of this uneven development, according to
Squires, include the two-tiered financial services system and the disproportionate
growth of subprime and predatory lending in underserved neighborhoods.43
Squires recommends several proposals to address the underlying inequality, including indexing the federal minimum wage to inflation, adopting living wage laws,
expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, inclusionary zoning laws, and tax-based
37.

See Silver & Marsico, supra note 5, at 284–85.

38. See id. at 279–82.
39.

See id.

40. See Squires, supra note 7, at 256–58.
41.

Id. at 257.

42.

Id. at 258.

43.

See id. at 260–64.
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revenue sharing.44 He also recommends laws and policies addressed directly to the
financial services industry, including expanding incentives for banks to provide electronic banking, CRA sanctions for banks that engage in predatory lending and credit
for those that pursue equitable lending, expanding the CRA to cover a range of nonbank lenders, passing a strong anti-predatory lending law, more aggressive enforcement
of the fair-lending laws, and imposing a loan suitability requirement on lenders.45
As the CRA hits early middle age, it is at a crossroads. It can continue on its
current path, which will likely lead it to oblivion. Or it can modernize and rise to
the challenge of regulating the financial services industry that has grown around it.
The articles in this issue suggest how the CRA should be improved and describe
other laws that should be passed to help the CRA to continue to democratize capital.
It is up to Congress and the federal banking agencies to take up the challenge and
improve the CRA.

44. See id. at 265–66.
45.

See id. at 265–68.
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